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Abstract
We present an international trade model with multiproduct rms. Firms are
heterogeneously endowed with two types of capabilities that jointly determine the
trade-o¤ within rms between managing a large portfolio of products and produc-
ing at low marginal cost. The model can explain many of the documented cross-
sectional correlations in rm performance measures, including why larger rms are
more productive and more diversied, and yet more diversied rms trade at a
discount. Globalization is shown to induce heterogeneous responses across rms
in terms of scope and productivity, some of which are consistent with existing
empirical work, while others are potentially testable.
Keywords: multiproduct rms, trade liberalization, diversication discount,
rm heterogeneity, productivity
JEL Classication: F12, F15
We thank the Editor (Jan Eeckhout) and three anonymous referees for helpful comments.
yEmail: nocke@uni-mannheim.de.
zEmail: sry3@psu.edu.
1 Introduction
Multiproduct rms dominate domestic and international commerce: they account for
91% of U.S. manufacturing sales (Bernard, Redding, and Schott, 2010) and 98% of
the value of U.S. manufacturing exports (Bernard, Redding, and Schott, 2007). The
empirical literature has documented many dimensions along which multiproduct rms
di¤er in their performance from single-product rms. On average, multiproduct rms
are larger than single-product rms (Bernard, Redding, and Schott, 2006) as well as
more productive (Schoar, 2002). Yet nancial markets tend to discount rm diversica-
tion: diversied rms exhibit, on average, lower market valuations relative to their book
valuations than less diversied rms (Lang and Stulz, 1994).
Why is it that rms that manage a large number of products tend to have a low
market-to-book ratio despite being more productive on average? More generally, what
underlying mechanisms can generate the broad (and sometimes seemingly contradictory)
range of cross-sectional correlations in rm performance measures? What is the likely
impact of a major economic shock such as globalization on these correlations?
To address these questions, we extend the Melitz (2003) model in two directions.
First, we allow each rm to choose the number of its products which involves an irrecov-
erable xed cost per product. Second, we assume that rms are heterogeneously endowed
with two types of capabilities, organizational capital and organizational e¢ ciency. Or-
ganizational capital is a necessary (intangible) input into the production of each product
managed by the rm. The more organizational capital is used in the production of a
given product, the lower is that products marginal cost. Because organizational capi-
tal is in xed supply within the rm, the rm faces a trade-o¤ between o¤ering more
products and producing each product at lower marginal cost (or, equivalently, higher
total factor productivity). A rms organizational e¢ ciency determines the severity of
that trade-o¤: the higher is a rms organizational e¢ ciency, the more e¤ective is orga-
nizational capital in reducing the rms marginal cost for a given product, and thus the
higher the opportunity cost of adding an additional product.
We characterize rms equilibrium choices of rm scope, scale, and export status
as a function of their two-dimensional types. This allows us to derive a number of
analytical predictions on the cross-sectional correlations of rm performance measures.
We show that a rms endowment of organizational e¢ ciency uniquely determines the
rms optimal ratio of organizational capital to its (endogenous) number of products
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and that this ratio is independent of the rms endowment of organizational capital.
As a rms TFP depends only on that ratio as well as on its organizational e¢ ciency,
and positively so, this implies that a rms equilibrium equilibrium level of TFP is
increasing in its organizational e¢ ciency but independent of its organizational capital.
Among rms of a given size, there is co-existence of rms with few products but high
TFP and rms with many products but low TFP. The model can therefore explain the
diversication discount puzzle:holding rm size xed, more diversied rms have a
lower ratio of market to book value (Schoar, 2002). We also establish a condition on
the distribution of organizational capital and organizational e¢ ciency in the population
of rms that implies a positive relationship between rm size and TFP, as found in the
data (Bartelsman, Haltiwanger, and Scarpetta, 2013). Similar to Melitz (2003), a rm
chooses to export if and only if its organizational e¢ ciency is above a certain cuto¤,
which is independent of the rms organizational capital.
A parameterized version of the model can simultaneously explain several more of
the cross-sectional correlations in rm performance measures that have emerged as key
stylized facts from the empirical literature. First, TFP and market-to-book ratio are
positively correlated in the cross-section of rms (Schoar, 2002). Second, there is a
positive cross-sectional correlation between the number of products a rm manages and
the sales per product (Bernard, Redding, and Schott, 2006). Third, exporters are on
average larger than non-exporters (Bernard and Jensen, 1999) but that correlation is
far from perfect (Hallak and Sivadasan, 2011). Fourth, exporters sell on average more
products than non-exporters (Bernard, Redding, and Schott, 2007).
In response to a bilateral trade liberalization, our model generates a heterogeneous
response by rms. The induced change in the number of products managed is continuous
in the size of the trade liberalization for both continuing exporters and continuing non-
exporters but it is of opposite sign: continuing exporters increase their diversication
while rms that continue to sell only domestically decrease their diversication. Firms
that are induced to switch to exporting choose to drop the number of their products
discontinuously so as to become leaner and meaner in the international market place.
The implied TFP response by rms is consistent with Schoar (2002) who shows that
an increase in the level of diversication of U.S. rms tends to be associated with a
reduction in the TFP of incumbent plants. Interestingly, our model predicts that the
implied response in the market-to-book ratio may be of the opposite sign to that of the
implied TFP response.
2
In the parameterized version of the model, we show that a trade liberalization gen-
erates a substantial increase in the number of products managed by rms on average
as well as an increase in industry-level TFP. Both of these ndings are consistent with
the empirical results in Bernard, Redding, and Schott (2011). We also show that the
rms that switch to become exporters after the trade liberalization experience a larger
increase in their TFP than those rms that continue to sell only domestically, which
is what Lileeva and Treer (2010) found in the case of the U.S.-Canadian Free Trade
Agreement.
Our paper is most closely related to the nascent literature that is concerned with
multiproduct rms in international trade (Eckel and Neary, 2010; Bernard, Redding,
and Schott, 2011; Mayer, Melitz and Ottaviano, forthcoming; Dhingra, forthcoming).
With the exception of Dhingra (forthcoming), in these papers rms draw a distribution
of marginal costs (or, equivalently, product-specic preference parameters) for various
products of di¤erent degrees of substitutability so that the marginal cost of any given
product is exogenous. In doing so, these papers focus on the within-rm distribution of
marginal costs. Only low marginal cost products are exported, and trade liberalization
induces rms to shed weaker products to focus on their core competencies.Instead, we
abstract from within-rm heterogeneity in order to explore a rather di¤erent mechanism,
namely one where a rms marginal cost for any given product depends on how the rm
solves the trade-o¤ between product proliferation and specialization, and rms di¤er in
the extent of this trade-o¤. This allows us to explain additional features of the data
such as the diversication discount and the heterogeneous response of rms to a trade
liberalization. Dhingra (forthcoming) di¤ers from the above-mentioned papers in that,
in her model, marginal costs are endogenous as rms can reduce their marginal costs
by investing in process innovation. In contrast to our model, the scope of a rm is
determined by the internalization of demand-side externalities (cannibalization) at
the rm level. This implies that, as in our model, a trade liberalization will generate
di¤erent responses by di¤erent rms. However, as the mechanism relies on demand-
side cannibalization, the model does not directly relate to the empirical literature on
multiproduct rms as that literature is using data at a level of aggregation at which
demand-side linkages are arguably negligible.1 In contrast to Dhingra (forthcoming), we
1For instance, Bernard, Redding and Schott (2011) work with data disaggregated to the 5-digit SIC
or about 1,500 products.
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explain why larger rms are more productive in terms of TFP and also more diversied,
and yet more diversied rms trade at a discount.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In the next section, we set out the closed
economy model. In Section 3, we derive the equilibrium in the closed economy and
show how di¤erent rms solve the trade-o¤ between diversication and TFP di¤erently.
We analyze how equilibrium rm performance measures change with changes in a rms
organizational capital and organizational e¢ ciency. We also demonstrate that the model
gives rise to a diversication discount when controlling for rm size. In Section 4, we
embed the model in an international trade setting with two identical countries. We
characterize rms exporting decisions as a function of their organizational e¢ ciency
and organizational capital. Further, we analyze the e¤ects of globalization on rms
performance measures. The section closes with a numerical analysis of a parameterized
version of the model. We conclude in Section 5.
2 The Closed Economy Model
We consider a discrete-time, innite horizon model of a closed economy with a single
(di¤erentiated goods) sector and a single factor of production (labor). There is a mass
L of identical consumers (workers) with a per-period CES utility function:
Us =
Z


xs(!)
 1
 d!
 
 1
;
where xs(!) is consumption of product ! 2 
 in period s, and  > 1 is the elasticity
of substitution between products. Products cannot be stored and there is no savings
technology.
In each period, each worker supplies a single unit of labor. The economy-wide wage
rate in period s is ws  1 and serves as numéraire. Aggregate per-period income is thus
equal to L. The resulting aggregate demand for product ! in period s is given by
Xs(!) = Asps(!)
 ; (1)
where ps(!) is the price of product ! in period s and
As  LR


ps(!) ( 1)d!
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the residual demand level.
In each period, there is a su¢ ciently large mass of atomless and ex ante identical
potential entrants. If a potential entrant decides not to enter, it obtains a prot of
zero; if it does decide to enter, the rm has to incur an irrecoverable setup cost F e.
A fraction F=F e 2 (0; 1] of this entry cost is used to build rm-specic (but perfectly
durable) capital equipment for which there is no resale market; the remaining fraction
(1 F=F e) 2 [0; 1) is spent on intangibles (e.g., advice, know how). Upon entry, the rm
receives a random draw of its time-invariant type (e;K) from a continuous distribution
function eG with associated density eg and support (0; 1=(   1)) [1;1). A rms type
(e;K) consists of two elements: its organizational e¢ ciency e and its organizational
capital K.
We think of organizational capitaland organizational e¢ ciencyas being two types
of rm capabilities that cannot be bought o¤ the shelf.2 In our model, organizational
capital is akin to a managerial input that is in xed supply within the rm: the more of it
is allocated to the production of one product, the less can be allocated to the production
of another. Increasing the allocation of organizational capital to a given product allows
the rm to produce that product at lower marginal cost. The rate at which an increase
in organizational capital reduces marginal cost is what we call organizational e¢ ciency.
Firms are heterogeneous both in their endowment of organizational capital as well as in
their organizational e¢ ciency.
After learning its type, the entrant has to decide on the size of its product portfolio:
for each of the N products it chooses to manage, the rm has to incur an irrecoverable
one-time development cost f to build rm-product-specic (but perfectly durable) capital
equipment. In each period, the rm has also to incur a constant labor cost per unit of
output. The marginal cost of product !, denoted c(!; k!;e), is decreasing in the amount
of organizational capital, k!, that the rm chooses to spend on the product:
c(!; k!;e) = ( zk e! if k!  1;1 otherwise,
where z > 0 is a cost parameter that is common to all rms and products.3 The rm
2According to the literature on organizational capital (e.g., Prescott and Visscher, 1980; Atkeson
and Kehoe, 2005), a key source of a rms value lies in the architectureof its organization, originating
in some framework of rules, routines, and tacit understandings that evolved over time(Sutton, 2012,
p. 12).
3The restriction k!  1 ensures that, holding the allocation of organizational capital to product !
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faces the following resource constraint on the allocation of its organizational capital:X
!2I
k!  K;
where I is the set of products managed by the rm. That is, the rms allocation of orga-
nizational capital over all of its products cannot exceed its endowment of organizational
capital.
At the end of each period, an active rm (including its assets) dies with probability
1   2 (0; 1) and survives with the remaining probability . For notational simplicity,
there is no discounting (i.e., the discount factor is equal to one).
The sequence of moves in each period is as follows:
1. Potential entrants decide whether or not to enter the market.
2. Each new entrant decides how many products to manage and how much organiza-
tional capital to spend on each of them.
3. Each active rm (new entrant or surviving incumbent) sets the prices of its various
products so as to maximize its prot. Prots are realized.
4. Each active rm dies with probability 1  .
3 The Closed Economy: Analysis
In this section, we rst derive the (stationary) equilibrium in the closed economy. We
then analyze the implied cross-sectional correlations in rm performance measures. We
provide conditions under which there is a positive cross-sectional correlation between
total factor productivity (TFP) on the one hand and rm size and market-to-book ratio
(Tobins Q) on the other. We also show that the model predicts a size premium when
controlling for rm scope, and a diversication discount when controlling for rm size.
3.1 Equilibrium in the Closed Economy
We solve for the equilibrium backwards. For notational convenience, it will prove useful
to use the following monotonic transformation of managerial e¢ ciency:   e( 1). We
xed, an increase in organizational e¢ ciency  (weakly) reduces the marginal cost of that product.
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will henceforth refer to  as the rms organizational e¢ ciency, and to (;K) as the rms
type, with associated distribution functionG and density g on support  (0; 1)[1;1).
Consider rst rmspricing decisions at stage 3. As each rm faces an iso-elastic
demand function, given by (1), each rm optimally charges a constant markup over
marginal cost for each one of its products. For a rm with organizational e¢ ciency 
that has previously allocated k! units of organizational capital to product !, the prot-
maximizing price of that product is therefore given by
p(!; k!; ) =


   1

c(!; k!; ):
We now turn to rmschoice of scope at stage 2. Let N(;K) denote the number of
products managed by a rm of type (;K).
The following lemma shows that a rm of type (;K) optimally allocates the same
amount of organizational capital to each one of the N(;K) products it chooses to
manage:
Lemma 1 A rm of type (;K) chooses to manage no more than K products, i.e.,
N(;K)  K. Moreover, it allocates k! = K=N(;K) units of organizational capital to
each one of its N(;K) products.
Proof. See Appendix.
The lemma implies that the marginal cost of a rm of type (;K) is given by
c(;K) = z

K
N(;K)
  
 1
;
so that the rm optimally chooses to charge price
p(;K) =


   1

c(;K)
=


   1

z

K
N(;K)
  
 1
: (2)
The rms per-period prot (gross of the sunk entry and product development costs) is
given by
(;K) = N(;K) [p(;K)  c(;K)]Ap(;K) 
= N(;K)(1  )f

K
N(;K)

, (3)
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where
  A
(1  )f

   1
z
 1
; (4)
A =
(1  )L
M
R

N(;K)p(;K) ( 1)dG(;K)
 ; (5)
and M is the mass of entrants in each period, and M=(1  ) the mass of active rms.
As  is proportional to A, we will henceforth (with a slight abuse of language) refer to
 as to the markup-adjusted residual demand level.
Having sunk the entry and product development costs, an active rms (market)
value, v(;K), is the expected sum of future prots, i.e.,
v(;K) =
(;K)
1  
= N(;K)f

K
N(;K)

; (6)
where the second equality follows from (3).
For simplicity, we will in the following focus on the case where  > 1. It is straightfor-
ward to show that this assumption holds in equilibrium if the entry cost F e is su¢ ciently
large. Moreover, we will be abstracting from the integer constraints on the number of
products so that N can take the value of any nonnegative real number.
By setting N arbitrarily small, and thus K=N arbitarily large, a rm can achieve
arbitrarily low marginal cost, no matter what its type. This implies that the market value
of a rm of type (;K) exceeds the (sunk) development costs of its N(;K) products:
v(;K) > N(;K)f . As there are no other xed costs, this implies that all entrants
choose to be active. The rms problem of choice of scope consists in choosing N so as
to maximize its subsequent market value net of the product development costs:
max
N0
Nf

K
N

 Nf; (7)
where the rst term is the expected sum of future prots, conditional on having chosen
to manage N products (see equation (6)), and the second term the cost of developing N
products.
The following proposition characterizes the solution to this problem:
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Proposition 1 In equilibrium, a rm of type (;K) chooses to manage
N(;K) =
(
K if  2 (0; ]
K [(1  )]1= if  2 [; 1) (8)
products, where   (   1)= 2 (0; 1).
Proof. See Appendix.
The proposition shows that the equilibrium number of products, N(;K), is propor-
tional to the rms organizational capital, K, independent of its organizational e¢ ciency
 for  < , and strictly decreasing in  for  >  (see the proof of the proposition). To
understand why, consider the rst-order condition to program (7):"
f

K
N

  f
#
  f

K
N

= 0:
The rst term on the LHS is the net prot of the marginal product, whereas the second
term is the e¤ect that the marginal product has on the total production costs of the
N inframarginal products. Abstracting from the corner solution (N = K), the optimal
number of products is achieved where these two e¤ects balance each other. Note that
organizational capital a¤ects this trade-o¤ only through the ratio K=N (the organiza-
tional capital per product). Hence, there is a uniquely optimal ratio K=N , which is
increasing in organizational e¢ ciency . As a result, the optimal number of products
is proportional to organizational capital K and (weakly) decreasing in organizational
e¢ ciency .
Finally, we consider rmsentry decisions at stage 1. Since potential entrants are ex
ante identical, free entry implies that they must be indi¤erent between entering and not:Z

ve(;K)dG(;K)  F e = 0; (9)
where
ve(;K)  (;K)
1    N(;K)f
is the value of an entrant of type (;K) after incurring the (type-independent) irrecov-
erable entry cost F e but before incurring the irrecoverable product development costs.
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Equilibrium in the labor market requires that
L =
M
1  
Z

N(;K)

Ap(;K) c(;K)

dG(;K)
+M

f
Z

N(;K)dG(;K) + F e

:
The LHS of this equation is labor supply. The rst term on the RHS is labor demand
for production from the mass M=(1   ) of active rms: a rm of type (;K) sells
Ap(;K)  units per product, resulting in labor demand of Ap(;K) c(;K) for each
of its N(;K) products. The second term on the RHS is labor demand from the mass
M of entrants for product development and setup. Using equation (5), the labor market
clearing condition simplies to
L = M

f
Z

N(;K)dG(;K) + F e

: (10)
Note that this equation implies that, in equilibrium, the mass M of entrants is propor-
tional to the size of the economy, L.
An equilibrium in the closed economy is given by the collection fN(; ); p(; );M; g
satisfying equations (2)(5) and (8)(10).
3.2 Cross-Sectional Correlation in Firm Performance Measures
We now investigate how various measures of rm performance such as prot, sales,
marginal cost, and Tobins Q vary with rm type in equilibrium.
Inserting (8) into (3), we can rewrite the per-period prot of a rm of type (;K) as
(;K) =
(
K(1  )f if  2 (0; ];
K(1  )f [(1  )] 1  if  2 [; 1): (11)
That is, per-period prot (and, by (6), market value) is proportional to the rms en-
dowment of organizational capital, K. However, (;K) varies non-monotonically with
the rms organizational e¢ ciency : @(;K)=@ = 0 for  2 (0; ), @(;K)=@ < 0
for  2  ;  and @(;K)=@ > 0 for  2  ; 1.4 At rst, it may seem surprising
4Note that
d [(1  )] 1 
d
=
1

[(1  )](1 )=  ();
10
that per-period prot is decreasing in managerial e¢ ciency on
 
; 

. To understand
this, recall that the per-period prot does not take into account any previously incurred
sunk costs. Indeed, as we have seen above, holding organizational capital xed, a rm
endowed with greater managerial e¢ ciency  >  optimally chooses to manage a smaller
number of products, thus sinking a smaller amount of product development costs. It
is straightforward to show that, from an ex ante point of view, being endowed with
greater managerial e¢ ciency is better for the rm: the value of an entrant, ve(;K), is
continuous and weakly increasing everywhere in  (and strictly so for  > ), holding K
xed.
The standard measure of rm size is rm sales (over all of the rms products).
As rms charge a xed markup, per-period sales are proportional to per-period prot:
S(;K) = (;K) for all (;K). From (11), rm sales can thus be written as
S(;K) =
(
(1  )fK if  2 (0; ];
(1  )fK [(1  )] 1  if  2 [; 1): (12)
As rm sales are proportional to rm prot, the e¤ects of changes in  and K on S(;K)
mirror those on (;K).
Let us now turn to measures of rm productivity. One such measure is the rms
total factor productivity (TFP). As the entry cost F e and the per-product development
cost f are sunk, TFP is equal to the inverse of marginal cost, which in turn is given by
c(;K) =
(
z if  2 (0; ];
z [(1  )] 1 1 if  2 [; 1): (13)
TFP is thus independent of the rms endowment of organizational capital K, and
increasing in the rms organizational e¢ ciency  for  >  (and independent of  for
 < ).
Recall that the market value of a rm is the sum of expected future prots, v(;K) =
(;K)=(1   ). Whereas the market value is thus forward looking, the book value is
where
 ()   1  ln [(1  )]

:
We have  () =  1,  () > 0 for  su¢ ciently close to 1, and  0() = (1  ) 1 +  2 ln [(1  )]. Let
 2 (; 1) be a solution to  () = 0. (By continuity of   and the intermediate value theorem,  exists.)
As  0() > 0,  is unique.
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backward looking and equal to the rms historic expenditure on capital equipment (or,
equivalently, its replacement cost):
b(;K) = F +N(;K)f (14)
=
(
F +Kf if  2 (0; ];
F +Kf [(1  )]1= if  2 [; 1) :
The market-to-book ratio of a rm of type (;K) Tobins Q is thus given by
Q(;K)  v(;K)
b(;K)
=
8<:
f
f+ F
K
if  2 (0; ];
f
(1 )(f+ FN(;K))
if  2 [; 1): (15)
It can easily be veried that Q(;K) is strictly increasing in the rms endowment of
organizational capital, K. Holding K xed, Q(;K) is independent of  for  < , and
strictly increasing in organizational e¢ ciency  for  su¢ ciently close to one. However,
for intermediate values of , the market-to-book ratio Q(;K) may be increasing or
decreasing in , depending on parameter values.
The empirical literature has shown that there is a tendency for larger rms to have
higher TFP than smaller rms (Bartelsman, Haltiwanger, and Scarpetta, 2013) and
that rms with higher TFP also exhibit a larger market-to-book ratio (Schoar, 2002).
In our model, a rms TFP is independent of organizational capital K and (weakly)
increasing in organizational e¢ ciency , rm size is increasing in K but non-monotonic
in , whereas the market-to-book ratio is increasing in K but not increasing everywhere
in . So, intuitively, one might expect that our model generates the cross-sectional
correlations between TFP and rm size and between TFP and Tobins Q found in the
data if there is a su¢ ciently strong positive correlation between K and . Proposition 2
below formalizes this intuition for the case where the distribution of rm types can be
characterized by an ordered pair (;K()):
Proposition 2 Suppose that the distribution of rm types could be characterized as
an ordered pair (;K()). Assume that the elasticity of K with respect to , () 
K 0()=K(), satises () > 0 for  2 (0; ), and
() > 1 + ln[(1  )]1=  () for  2 (; 1); (16)
where () < 1. Then:
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1. Marginal cost c(;K()) is (weakly) decreasing and rm sales S(;K()) increasing
in  for all  2 (0; 1). That is, there is a positive cross-sectional correlation between
TFP and rm size.
2. Marginal cost c(;K()) is (weakly) decreasing and Tobins Q(;K()) increasing
in  for all  2 (0; 1). That is, there is a positive cross-sectional correlation between
TFP and the market-to-book ratio.
Proof. See Appendix.
The empirical literature has established that larger rms tend to be more productive
in terms of TFP (Bartelsman, Haltiwanger, and Scarpetta, 2013) and more diversied
in terms of the number of products they manage (Bernard, Redding, and Schott, 2006).
At rst glance, these results may seem to be at odds with a very well known nding
in the corporate nance literature the diversication discount puzzle (Lang and Stulz,
1994), according to which more diversied rms tend to be less productive in terms of
Tobins Q. The diversication discount holds, in particular, when controlling for rm
size (Schoar, 2002).5
The following proposition shows that these seemingly contradictory empirical nd-
ings are consistent with each other. Our model can not only account for the observed
correlations between TFP and size and between TFP and Tobins Q but it predicts a
size premium when controlling for diversication and a diversication discount when
controlling for rm size:
Proposition 3 Holding diversication N(;K) xed, there is a positive cross-sectional
relationship between rm size S(;K) and the market-to-book ratio Q(;K). Holding
rm size S(;K) xed, there is a negative cross-sectional relationship between rm scope
N(;K) and the market-to-book ratio Q(;K).
Proof. See Appendix.
5Several explanations of the diversication discount puzzle have been proposed in the corporate
nance literature. For instance, Rajan, Servaes and Zingales (2000) provide an explanation based on
agency costs that result in the misallocation of resources across divisions. Maksimovic and Phillips
(2002) argue that the diversication discount puzzle can better be explained by comparative advantage
across sectors. There are also some who argue that the diversication discount may in fact be a statistical
artifact of selection (Villalonga, 2004).
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To understand why our model predicts a size premium, holding diversication xed,
suppose two rms optimally choose the same number of products but one rm is larger
than the other in terms of sales. Then, it has to be the case that both rms have the
same book value but that the larger rm has higher TFP and therefore a higher market
value. To understand why our model predicts a diversication discount, holding rm size
xed, suppose two rms are of the same size but one rm chooses to manage a larger
number of products than the other. Then, it has to be the case that both rms have
the same market value (which is proportional to rm size) but that the more diversied
rm had to have made a larger investment in product-specic capital in the past and
therefore has a larger book value.
4 The Open Economy
In this section, we extend the model to incorporate a simple trading environment between
two identical countries, home and foreign. We rst derive the equilibrium and various
rm performance measures (and their cross-sectional correlations). We then analyze the
e¤ects of globalization (a symmetric fall in trade costs) on equilibrium, showing that our
model generates a number of predictions that are consistent with the empirical ndings
in the literature. In the last part of this section, we numerically analyze a parameterized
version of the model, which gives rise to several additional cross-sectional correlations
that have been documented in the empirical literature.
When choosing at stage 2 how many products to manage, a new entrant also decides
for each of its products whether to sell it only domestically or both domestically and
abroad. If it chooses to export any particular product, the entrant must incur at that
stage a one-time irrecoverable cost of fx to set up a rm-product-specic distribution
system. At stage 3, rms have to pay an iceberg-type trading cost  > 1 for each unit
shipped to the foreign market.
4.1 Equilibrium in the Open Economy
As in the closed economy, the prot-maximizing price of a rm of type (;K) that has
allocated k! units of organizational capital to product ! involves a constant markup over
marginal cost: the rms domestic price is p(!; k!; ) = (=(   1)) c(!; k!; ) whereas
the price charged abroad (in case the rm chooses to serve that market) is p(!; k!; ) =
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p(!; k!; ), reecting the higher cost of serving the foreign market.
Turning to the allocation of organizational capital and export decisions, the following
lemma provides a preliminary result:
Lemma 2 A rm of type (;K) chooses to manage no more than K products, i.e.,
N(;K)  K. Generically, it exports all of its products, denoted x(;K) = 1, or none,
x(;K) = 0. In either case, the rm allocates the same amount k! = K=N(;K) of its
organizational capital to each one of its N(;K) products.
Proof. See Appendix.
It follows from this lemma that all of the N(;K) products of rm (;K) have the
same marginal cost,
c(;K) = z

K
N(;K)
  
 1
; (17)
so that the rm optimally charges price
p(;K) =


   1

c(;K); (18)
for all of its products in the domestic market, and provided the rm chooses to export
(x(;K) = 1) price
p(;K) = 


   1

c(;K): (19)
for all of its products in the foreign market. The rms stage-2 problem of choice of
scope, allocation of organizational capital, and export status therefore simplies to
max
N2[0;K];x2f0;1g
N
"
f (1 + x)

K
N

  (f + xfx)
#
; (20)
where    ( 1) is a measure of trade freeness.
To avoid a taxonomy of cases, we impose in the following (as in the closed econ-
omy case) an implicit restriction on parameters such that the markup-adjusted residual
demand level , dened as before in (4), satises6
ln(1 + fx=f)
ln(1 + )
>  > 1. (21)
Given this assumption, the following proposition states the solution to program (20):
6This restriction ensures that, in equilibrium, any rm (;K) that chooses to export sets N(;K) <
K, i.e., x > , where the export cuto¤ x will be dened in Proposition 4.
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Proposition 4 In the equilibrium of the open economy, the export decision of a rm of
type (;K) is given by
x(;K) =
(
0 if  2 (0; x);
1 if  2 (x; 1); (22)
where
x  1  ln(1 + )
ln(1 + fx=f)
2 (; 1): (23)
The rms equilibrium number of products is
N(;K) =
8>><>>:
K if  2 (0; ];
K ((1  ) ) 1 if  2 [; x);
K
h
1+
1+fx=f

(1  ) 
i 1

if  2 (x; 1):
(24)
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 4 demonstrates that a rms export decision is independent of its orga-
nizational capital K, depending only on its organizational e¢ ciency : a rm chooses
to export, x(;K) = 1, if and only if  > x. The reason why a rms endowment
of organizational capital does not a¤ect its export decision is that the only xed costs
of exporting are at the product level but not at the rm level. The reason why a rm
chooses to export if and only if its organizational e¢ ciency is su¢ ciently large is that a
rm with greater organizational e¢ ciency optimally chooses to have lower marginal cost
(as we have already seen in the closed economy case), thus allowing the rm to make
a su¢ ciently high gross prot per product abroad to cover the one-time product-level
xed cost of exporting. As we discuss in the next subsection, N(;K) is discontinu-
ous at  = x: the number of products managed by a non-exporter with organizational
e¢ ciency just below x is discretely larger than that managed by an exporter with orga-
nizational e¢ ciency just above x. By doing so, an exporter saves on the product-level
export cost and sells more units per product at lower marginal cost.
Given that a rm either exports all of its products or none, its per-period prot
(having sunk the entry, product development and export costs) can be written as
(;K) = N(;K)(1  )f [1 + x(;K)]

K
N(;K)

: (25)
The free entry condition is again given byZ

ve(;K)dG(;K)  F e = 0; (26)
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where the value ve(;K) of a new entrant of type (;K) now accounts for the fact that
a new entrant may choose to become an exporter:
ve(;K) =
(;K)
1    N(;K)(f + 
x(;K)fx): (27)
The labor market clearing condition in the open economy is given by
L =
AM
1  


   1
  Z

(1 + x(;K))N(;K)c(;K) ( 1)dG(;K)
+M
Z

(f + x(;K)fx)N(;K)dG(;K) + F e

= M
Z

(f + x(;K)fx)N(;K)dG(;K) + F e

; (28)
where the second equality follows from the fact that
A =
(1  )L
M
R

(1 + x(;K))N(;K)p(;K) ( 1)dG(;K)
 : (29)
As in the closed economy case, the equilibrium mass M of entrants is thus proportional
to the size of the economy, L.
An equilibrium in the open economy is given by the collection fN(; ); p(; ); p(; ); x(; );M; g
satisfying equations (17)(19) and (22)(29).
4.2 Cross-Sectional Correlations in Firm Performance Mea-
sures
We now turn to the key rm performance measures and their cross-sectional correlations.
Inserting (24) into (17), we obtain marginal cost (the inverse of TFP) as a function
of rm type:
c(;K) =
8>><>>:
z if  2 (0; )
z ((1  )) 1 1 if  2 (; x)
z
h
(1  )

1+
1+fx=f
i 1
 1
if  2 (x; 1)
:
As in the closed economy case, the marginal cost of the rm is independent of K, and
strictly decreasing in  for all  > . However, mirroring our earlier observation that
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N(;K) drops discretely with an increase in  at the export threshold  = x, marginal
cost is discontinuous at  = x. A rm with organizational e¢ ciency  = x is indi¤erent
between exporting and selling only domestically. If it chooses to export, the rm opti-
mally increases the TFP of its production processes by focusing its organizational capital
on fewer products. The opportunity cost of becoming productive enough to export is
the reduction in domestic prots due to the reduced product range.
Inserting (24) into (25), we obtain the per-period prot of a rm of type (;K):
(;K) =
8>><>>:
K(1  )f if  2 (0; ];
K(1  )f [(1  )](1 )= if  2 [; x];
K
 
1 
1 

(f + fx)
h
1+
1+fx=f

(1  ) 
i 1

if  2 [x; 1):
(30)
As in the closed economy case, the rms sales are proportional to its per-period prot:
S(;K) = (;K) (31)
From (30) and (31), it follows that per-period prot and sales are discontinuous in  at
the export cuto¤ x, jumping up as the number of products managed drops.7
As before, the rms market value is v(;K) = (;K)=(1   ) whereas its book
value is the replacement cost of its tangible assets that it previously accumulated for
entry, product development and export distribution: b(;K) = F + N(;K)f if  < x
and b(;K) = F + N(;K)(f + fx) if  > x. The rms value of Tobins Q, which is
the ratio of the two, is thus given by
Q(;K) =
8>>><>>>:
f
f+ F
K
if  2 (0; );
f
(1 )(f+ FN(;K))
if  2 (; x);
f+fx
(1 )(f+fx+ FN(;K))
if  2 (x; 1);
(32)
where N(;K) is given by (24).
7To see this, note that
ln

lim#x S(;K)
lim"x S(;K)

= ln(1 + ) +

1
x
  1

ln

1 + 
1 + fx=f

=
1  x
x
+ ln

1 +
fx
f

> 0;
where we have used the denition of x to establish the last equality.
18
As the following proposition shows, our result on the diversication discount (holding
rm size xed) carries over the open economy setting:
Proposition 5 Consider two rms of di¤erent types, (;K) and (0; K 0), with the same
level of sales, S(;K) = S(0; K 0). Then, the rm that produces the larger number of
products will have a lower market-to-book ratio: N(0; K 0) > N(;K) implies Q(0; K 0) <
Q(;K). That is, when controlling for rm size, there is a diversication discount in the
equilibrium of the open economy.
Proof. See Appendix.
4.3 The E¤ects of Globalization on Firm Performance
We now explore the e¤ects of a reduction in the iceberg-type trade cost  (and thus
of an increase in the trade freeness parameter ) on rmsdecisions and the resulting
impact on rm performance measures. We conne attention to changes that are small
enough to preserve the parameter restriction (21). (In the following, we will index post-
liberalization variables by a prime.)
The following lemma shows how trade liberalization a¤ects the e¤ective market size
for exporters and non-exporters.
Lemma 3 Consider an increase in trade freeness from  to 0 > . This lowers the
e¤ective market size facing non-exporters, i.e.,  0 < , and raises the e¤ective market
size facing exporters, i.e.,  0(1 + 0) > (1 + ).
Proof. See Appendix.
An immediate implication of the lemma is that trade liberalization results in an
increase in welfare by inducing a lower price index (or, equivalently, an increase in the
markup-adjusted residual demand level). The lemma also makes clear that a fall in trade
costs reduces the e¤ective market size facing rms that do not export while raising the
e¤ective market size of exporting rms. As exporting becomes more attractive and the
domestic market less attractive, the cuto¤s for maximal diversication and exporting
change, as the next proposition shows.
Proposition 6 Consider an increase in trade freeness from  to 0 > . This induces
the thresholds for exporting and for maximal diversication to fall: x0 < x and 0 < .
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Proof. Equation (23) immediately implies that x0 < x. Lemma 1, which establishes
that  0 < , and the fact that   (   1)= is increasing in , imply that 0 < .
As in Melitz (2003), an increase in the freeness of trade lowers the (organizational)
e¢ ciency threshold above which a rm selects into exporting: Following a trade liberal-
ization, any rm (;K) with  2 (x0; x) will switch from non-exporting to exporting. In
our setting, there is also another form of selection. As the e¤ective size of the domestic
market becomes smaller, due to a reduction in trade costs for foreign rms, the threshold
above which rms opt to be less than maximally diversied falls as well.
The next proposition formally considers how the choice of rm scope is a¤ected by a
trade liberalization.
Proposition 7 Consider an increase in trade freeness from  to 0 > . This causes
rms that initially sold only domestically to drop products, i.e., N(;K)0  N(;K)
for all  2 (0; x), with a strict inequality if  2 (0; x), and all continuing exporters to
increase the number of products they manage, i.e., N(;K)0 > N(;K) for all  2 (x; 1).
Proof. See Appendix.
Trade liberalization causes rms that do not export prior to the trade shock to drop
product lines. This e¤ect is especially strong for rms that are induced by the trade
liberalization to switch to exporting because an exporter optimally wants to be leaner
and meaner,as discussed before. On the other hand, for continuing exporters the trade
shock results in a larger e¤ective market size to which they respond by adding more
products. These results suggest systematic and asymmetric changes in rmsmarginal
costs, which the following corollary substantiates.
Corollary 1 Consider an increase in trade freeness from  to 0 > . For rms that
initially sold only domestically, this results in higher TFP, i.e., c(;K)0  c(;K) for all
 2 (0; x), with a strict inequality if  2 (0; x). For continuing exporters, this results
in lower TFP, i.e., c(;K)0 > c(;K) for all  2 (x; 1).
Proof. This follows directly from the denition of marginal cost (the inverse of TFP)
and Proposition 7.
The changes in the number of product lines managed by rms of di¤erent types
implies a particular productivity e¤ect that varies across rms. Those non-exporters
that choose to drop products experience an increase in their TFP as these rms become
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leaner and meaner.Those rms that switch to become exporters after the reduction
in trade costs also see their TFP rise: as they face the rst-order e¤ect associated with
paying the additional xed cost fx per product, they choose to become leaner and
meaner, too. Finally, continuing exporters see their TFP fall as they adjust to an
e¤ectively larger market by expanding their product scope.
To complete our analysis, the following proposition considers how a trade liberaliza-
tion a¤ects Tobins Q across rms.
Proposition 8 Consider an increase in trade freeness from  to 0 > . There exists a
threshold value of organizational e¢ ciency, b 2 (x0; x), such that any rm (;K) with
organizational e¢ ciency below that threshold experiences a reduction in their market-to-
book ratio, i.e., Q(;K)0 < Q(;K) if  < b, while the opposite holds for any other rm,
i.e., Q(;K)0 > Q(;K) if  > b.
Proof. See Appendix.
Tobins Q falls for non-exporters because the trade liberalization induces a decrease
in the home markets markup-adjusted residual demand level , which directly reduces
the protability of such rms. For exporting rms the increase in access to the foreign
market more than compensates for this fall in  as (1+0) 0 > (1+). Hence, we see that
there is a negative relationship between the e¤ect of trade liberalization on a rms TFP
and the e¤ect on its Tobins Q! The model thus cautions analysts to carefully consider
what drives rmsperformance measures. Falling TFP can be associated with rising
protability if greater access to foreign markets induces rms to diversify their product
mix. On the other hand, non-exporting rms are hurt by the trade liberalization and see
their protability fall but optimally respond by becoming leaner, which increases their
TFP.
4.4 Numerical Example
To further elaborate on the models implications, we explore a numerical example. We
discipline the choice of parameters in our example by matching three well known facts
about the distribution of rm performance measures. Holding xed this parameteriza-
tion, the model implies a rich set of cross-sectional correlations in other rm performance
measures that are consistent with the sign of the correlations found in the empirical lit-
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erature.8 We also consider the comparative static of a 10 percent multilateral decrease
in iceberg trade costs and show that the model implies heterogeneous responses across
rms that are also consistent with recent empirical work.
To implement our numerical example, we approximate the continuous distribution
function G by drawing 10,000 times a pair (;K) from a Gumbel copula with Pareto
marginals for K and Power marginals for . Given an initial guess of the mass of
entrants, M , we allow rms to choose the number of their products and their export
status and then calculate their prots as a function of their type andM . AdjustingM if
average realized prots are non-zero, we iterate until the free entry condition holds. We
choose the distributional parameters and the export costs so that the following empirical
observations hold in the numerical example: (i) the size distribution of rms is consistent
with Zipfs law, (ii) 20% of rms export, and (iii) conditional on exporting, a rms export
sales are roughly 15% of its total revenue.9 Finally, we choose the sunk entry cost relative
to the sunk cost of opening a plant so that most rms are not maximally diversied.10
We rst discuss the parameterized models implications for the relationship between
size, TFP, and export status. The results are shown in Figure 1, where the logarithm of
rm size for non-exporters (shown as dark triangles) and exporters (shown as light Xs)
is plotted against the logarithm of rm TFP.
The model is consistent with several well-documented features of the data. First,
as found by Bartelsman, Haltiwanger, and Scarpetta (2013), there is a strong positive
correlation between the logarithm of aggregate sales and the logarithm of TFP. Second,
as documented by Bernard and Jensen (1999), exporters have on average larger aggregate
sales than non-exporters. Third, despite the fact that exporters are on average larger
8We view our numerical exercise as illustrative of the kinds of correlations the model can generate
rather than as a calibration exercise. The latter would require a more formal modeling of country
asymmetries that is outside the scope of the present paper.
9Bernard, Redding and Schott (2007) report in the appendix to their paper that 20% of manufacturing
rms export and that the share of their exports in total revenue is 15%.
10The parameter values chosen in the simulation are as follows. Without loss of generality, we set
 = 0. To be consistent with a 25% mark-up we set  = 5. We set the xed cost of opening a plant
to f = 4 and the trade costs to fx = 1:5 and  = 1:5. We assume that all of the entry cost is spent
on tangible assets, i.e., F e = F , and choose this cost to be F = 30, and the population size to be
L = 300. Turning to distributional parameters, the Gumbel dependence parameter is set to 4, the
Pareto marginals for K have a shape parameter of 1.05, and the Power distribution for  has a shape
parameter of 0.25. Note that this choice of parameters satises condition (21).
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Figure 1: The gure plots the log of rm sales (on the vertical axis) against the log of
TFP (on the horizontal axis), both for non-exporters (triangles) and exporters (Xs).
than non-exporters, there is no strict sorting of rms into export mode based solely on
rm size as can be seen from the substantial overlap in rm sizes in Figure 1. This
is consistent with the empirical observation made in Hallak and Sivadasan (2011) that
there is no strict sorting on the basis of rm size in the data.
Turning to nancial performance measures, Figure 2 shows the simulated relationship
between the logarithm of Tobins Q for non-exporters (depicted as dark triangles) and
exporters (depicted as light Xs) and the logarithm of TFP. Consistent with the results of
Schoar (2002), rms that display high levels of TFP tend to have higher levels of Tobins
Q. Note, however, that for a given level of TFP there is substantial heterogeneity in
the realized Tobins Q, which reects variation in the extent of diversication across
rms. It is this variability that is associated with the diversication discount that arises
generically in our model (see Propositions 3 and 5 for the closed economy and open
economy, respectively).
In the data, there is a positive link between the number of products a rm manages
and its aggregate sales and the likelihood that the rm exports (Bernard, Redding, and
Schott, 2006 and 2007). The relationship between these rm performance measures in
our numerical example is shown in Figure 3. There is a striking correlation between
the number of products a rm manages and its aggregate sales. Less obvious from
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Figure 2: The gure plots the log of Tobins Q (on the vertical axis) against the log of
TFP (on the horizontal axis), both for non-exporters (triangles) and exporters (Xs).
the gure is that the correlation between the logarithm of the number of products a
rm manages and the logarithm of sales per product is also positive (0.36). Further, the
simulation results indicate that although there is substantial overlap between the number
of products managed by exporters and non-exporters, on average exporters manage 45%
more products than rms that do not export. Both of these implications are consistent
with the data.
A substantial empirical literature has developed in the last ten years that documents
the impact both at the industry level and the rm level of a reduction in global trading
costs. We conclude this section by comparing two equilibria that di¤er only in the size
of trade costs. In particular, we consider how the number of products managed by rms
and the TFP of those rms change when trade costs are reduced by 10%.
Table 1 reports the average fractional changes in the number of products managed
(rst row) and TFP (second row) that are induced by the trade liberalization. These
induced changes are computed for three groups of rms. The rst column shows the
average fractional changes across all rms. The second row shows the average fractional
changes for rms that do not export prior to the trade liberalization but choose to export
thereafter, whereas the third column reports the average fractional changes for rms that
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Figure 3: The gure plots the log of rm sales (on the vertical axis) against the log of
a rms number of products (on the horizontal axis), both for non-exporters (triangles)
and exporters (Xs).
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Change in All Firms Switchers Never Export
Number of Products -18% -34% -21%
TFP +0.5% +4.3% 0.4%
Table 1: The table shows the e¤ect of the trade liberalization on the number of products
and TFP by rmsexport status.
never export.
The results of our comparative static are broadly consistent with those found in
the empirical literature. As documented by Bernard, Redding, and Schott (2011), a
trade liberalization is associated with a substantial reduction in the number of products
managed by rms on average (column 1, row 1) and an increase in industry-level TFP
(column 1, row 2).
Recently, Lileeva and Treer (2010) have shown that Canadian rms exposed to the
U.S.-Canadian Free Trade Agreement tari¤ reductions responded very di¤erently de-
pending on whether they switched to exporting after the trade liberalization or not.
In particular, rms that remained non-exporters even after the trade liberalization ex-
perienced modest or no productivity changes while rms that switched to exporting
experienced very substantial improvements in TFP. As illustrated in Table 1, our model
generates heterogeneous responses across rms similar to those found in the data. Com-
paring columns 2 and 3 of Table 1, we see that those rms that are induced to export
(column 2) choose to reduce the number of their products and therefore experience large
increases in their TFP, while the responses of non-exporting rms (column 3) are sub-
stantially weaker.
Note that the positive link between the change in the number of products managed
and the change in measured TFP illustrated in Table 1 is also consistent with existing
empirics. Schoar (2002) shows that an increase in the level of diversication of U.S. rms
tends to be associated with a reduction in the TFP of incumbent plants. Our model
produces exactly such a relationship when an external shock, such as a change in trade
costs, induces rms to alter their scope.
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5 Conclusion
We developed an international trade model with multiproduct rms. In the model, rms
are heterogeneously endowed with a stock of organizational capital and the e¢ ciency
with which organizational capital can be used to reduce marginal cost. This gives rise to
a trade-o¤ between focusing on managing few products at low marginal cost and many
products at high marginal cost. Depending on their endowment, di¤erent rms solve
this tradeo¤ di¤erently.
Our model generates cross-sectional correlations in rm performance measures that
are qualitatively consistent with the data. In particular, our model can simultaneously
give rise to two seemingly contradictory empirical correlations: a positive correlation
between rm size and rm TFP and a negative correlation between Tobins Q and the
number of products managed by a rm.
Our model generates heterogeneous responses across rms to a trade liberalization
that are also consistent with the recent empirical literature. Trade can cause a decrease in
the average number of products managed by rms and an increase in average productivity
that is particularly pronounced among rms that are induced to export. The model also
generates interesting new predictions. For instance, while a trade liberalization ought to
raise the market-to-book ratio of exporting rms, the increase in this nancial indicator
should be negatively correlated with measured TFP.
To make our analysis as transparent as possible, we simplied along several dimen-
sions. For instance, we treated all products as being perfectly symmetric. Allowing for
heterogeneity across products would allow for richer resource allocation issues to arise
within the rm. Moreover, we have kept the analysis static, assuming that endowments
of organizational capital are randomly assigned to rms, thereby avoiding the analysis
of the accumulation of organizational capital within the rm. We leave this for future
research.
6 Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. Let I denote the rms set of products. Conditional on having
incurred the irrecoverable development cost for its N = #I products, the rm optimally
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allocates its organizational capital so as to maximize the sum of its future prots:
max
fk!g!2I
A
(1  )

   1
z
 1 X
!2I+f!2Ijk!1g
(k!)

subject to
X
!2I
k!  K:
Note that the objective function is increasing and concave in the k!s. For a given set I of
products, it is thus optimal for the rm to exhaust all of its endowment of organizational
capital (i.e., set
P
!2I k! = K) and, for each ! 2 I, to choose either k! = k  1 or
k! = 0. However, it cannot be optimal to chose a set I of products and then allocate
k! = 0 to some product ! 2 I (resulting in innite marginal cost for that product); in
that case, the rm would have increased its prot by choosing not to develop that good
and saving development cost f . Hence, a rm of type (;K) chooses to manage no more
than K products, N(;K)  K, and sets k! = K=N(;K) for each one of its N(;K)
products.
Proof of Proposition 1. Let eN(;K) denote the solution to the rst-order condition
of program (7), i.e.,
(1  )fK eN(;K)    f = 0;
or eN(;K) = K [(1  )] 1 .
Note that eN(;K) > 0 for all (;K) 2 ; that is, each entrant chooses to be active.
By Lemma 1, the solution to the rst-order condition, eN(;K), is the solution to the
problem of prot maximization only if eN(;K)  K. The value-maximizing number of
products is thus given by
N(;K) = min
n
K; eN(;K)o :
Next, we show that eN(;K) is strictly decreasing in . Taking the partial derivative
of eN(;K) with respect to , and dividing by K, we obtain
@ eN(;K)
@
1
K
=  

[(1  )] 1    1
2
[(1  )] 1 ln ((1  ))
=   
2
[(1  )] 1  	();
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where
	()   + (1  ) ln ((1  )) : (33)
Hence, @ eN(;K)=@ < 0 if and only if 	() > 0. Now, we have 	(0) = ln() > 0 as
 > 1 by assumption. Further,
	0() =   ln ((1  )) ;
	00() =
1
1   > 0,
so that 	() achieves its unique minimum at m  ( 1)=, which is the unique solution
on (0; 1) to 	0(m) = 0. But note that 	(m) = m > 0, implying that 	() > 0 for all
. Hence, @ eN(;K)=@ < 0, and thus
N(;K) =
(
K if  2 (0; ];eN(;K) if  2 [; 1);
where   (   1)= is such that eN(;K) = K.
Proof of Proposition 2.
The assertion on the relationship between marginal cost and  follows directly from
(13). To see that S(;K()) is increasing in  for all  2 (0; 1), consider equation (12).
Note rst that @S(;K)=@ = 0 and @S(;K)=@K > 0 for  2 (0; ). So, () > 0
implies that S(;K()) is increasing in  for  2 (0; ). For  2 (; 1) we have:
d lnS(;K())
d
=
K 0()
K()
  1

 
1 + ln[(1  )]1= ;
which is strictly positive if and only if (16) holds. To see that Q(;K()) is increasing
in  for all  2 (0; 1), consider equation (15). Note rst that @Q(;K)=@ = 0 and
@Q(;K)=@K > 0 for  2 (0; ). So, () > 0 implies that Q(;K()) is increasing in 
for  2 (0; ). For  2 (; 1) we have:
d lnQ(;K())
d
=
K 0()
K()
  1


1
1   + ln[(1  )]
1=

+
1
1  
+
f [(1  )]1=

K()
(1 ) +
K()

ln[(1  )]1=  K 0()

F +K()f [(1  )]1= ;
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which is strictly positive if and only if
K 0()
K()
"
1  f [(1  )]
1=
F
K()
+ f [(1  )]1=
#
>
1


1
1   + ln[(1  )]
1=
"
1  f [(1  )]
1=
F
K()
+ f [(1  )]1=
#
  1
1   ;
or
() >
1
1   + ln[(1  )]
1=   
1  
"
F
K()
+ f [(1  )]1=
F
K()
#
= ()  
(1  )
fK()
F
[(1  )]1=;
where() is as dened in (16). Hence, () > () implies thatQ(;K()) is increasing
in  for  2 (; 1).
Proof of Proposition 3. First, consider two rms, (0; K 0) and (00; K 00), that share
the same degree of diversication, N(0; K 0) = N(00; K 00). As b(;K) = F + N(;K)f ,
this implies that the two rms have the same book value: b(0; K 0) = b(00; K 00). But
then one rm has a larger market-to-book ratio than the other, Q(0; K 0) > Q(00; K 00),
if and only if the former has a larger market value, v(0; K 0) > v(00; K 00), which holds
if and only if that rm is larger, S(0; K 0) > S(00; K 00) as v(;K) = S(;K)=[(1  )].
Hence, there is a positive relationship between rm size and Tobins Q, holding rm
scope xed.
Consider now two rms, (0; K 0) and (00; K 00), with the same level of sales, S(0; K 0) =
S(00; K 00). As v(;K) = S(;K)=[(1   )], this implies that the two rms have the
same market value: v(0; K 0) = v(00; K 00). Thus, one rm has a larger market-to-book
ratio than the other, Q(0; K 0) > Q(00; K 00), if and only if the former has a smaller book
value, b(0; K 0) < b(00; K 00). But as b(;K) = F +N(;K)f , this holds if and only if the
former is less diversied, N(0; K 0) < N(00; K 00). Hence, there is a negative relationship
between diversication and Tobins Q, holding rm size xed.
Proof of Lemma 2. Let I denote the rms set of products. Conditional on having
incurred the irrecoverable development cost for itsN = #I products, and given its choice
of which product(s) to export (if any), the rm optimally allocates its organizational
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capital so as to maximize the sum of its future prots:
max
fk!g!2I
f
X
!2I+f!2Ijk!1g
[1 + (!)] (k!)

subject to
X
!2I
k!  K
where    ( 1) is a measure of trade freeness, (!) = 1 if the rm chooses to export
product !, and (!) = 0 otherwise. Note that the objective function is increasing and
concave in k! for k!  1 but independent of k! for k! < 1. For a given set I of products,
it is thus optimal for the rm to exhaust all of its endowment of organizational capital
(i.e., set
P
!2I k! = K) and, for each ! 2 I, to choose k! 2 f0; kxg with kx  1 if
(!) = 1, and k! 2 f0; kdg with kd  1 if (!) = 0. However, it cannot be optimal to
chose a set I of products and then allocate k! = 0 to some product ! 2 I (resulting in
innite marginal cost for that product); in that case, the rm would have increased its
prot by choosing not to develop that good and saving development cost f (as well as fx
if (!) = 1). Hence, a rm of type (;K) chooses to manage no more than K products,
N(;K)  K.
The Lagrangian associated with the rms stage-2 decisions can thus be written as
L = fN
h
(1  )  kd + (1 + ) (kx)i  N (1  )kd + kx   K
N

;
where  is the share of exported products, and  the Lagrange multiplier on the rms
organizational capital constraint. As the Lagrangian is linear in , it is optimal for the
rm to set  2 f0; 1g, i.e., to export either all of its products or none.
Proof of Proposition 4. Suppose rst that the rm chooses not to export, x = 0,
so that program (20) simplies to (7). As we have seen in Section 3.1, the solution to
this program is Nd(;K) = minfK;K [(1  ) ]1=g and the resulting expected sum of
future prots (net of product development costs)
vd(;K) = max

Kf [   1] ; Kf [(1  ) ]1=


1  

; (34)
where the rst argument on the RHS is positive by (21).Next, suppose that the rm
chooses to export, x = 1, so that program (20) becomes
max
N2[0;K]
N
"
f (1 + )

K
N

  (f + fx)
#
:
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From the rst-order condition,"
f (1 + )

K
N

  (f + fx)
#
  f (1 + )

K
N

= 0;
and the constraint N  K, we obtain the solution to this program:
Nx(;K) = min
(
K;K

1 + 
1 + fx=f

(1  ) 
 1

)
:
The resulting expected sum of future prots (net of the product development and export
costs) is
vx(;K) = max
(
Kf [ (1 + )  (1 + fx=f)] ; Kf

1 + 
1 + fx=f

(1  ) 
 1

(1 + fx=f)


1  
)
:
As x= lnx is increasing in x for x > 1, condition (21) implies that the rst argument in
the max-function is negative. Hence, vx(;K) simplies to
vx(;K) = Kf

1 + 
1 + fx=f

(1  ) 
 1


1 +
fx
f


1  

The rm optimally chooses not to export, x(;K) = 0, if vd(;K) > vx(;K), and
to export, x(;K) = 1, if the inequality is reversed. Now, vx(;K) is larger than the
second argument in the max-function on the RHS of (34) if and only if
1 + 
1 + fx=f
 1

(1 + fx=f) > 1;
or
 > x  1  ln (1 + )
ln (1 + fx=f)
:
Note that x < 1. Condition (21) implies that x > . As the second argument in
the max-function on the RHS of (34) is larger than the rst argument in that same
max-function if and only if  > , we have vx(;K) > vd(;K) if and only if  > x.
Equations (22) and (24) follow.
Proof of Proposition 5. For two rms that are either both exporters (minf; 0g > x)
or both non-exporters (maxf; 0g < x), the argument in the proof of Proposition 3
carries over to the open economy case. What still needs to be shown is that the result
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obtains for an exporting rm with  > x when compared to a non-exporting rm for
which 0 < x. From the expression for Tobins Q in (32), we have
Q(;K)
Q(0; K 0)
=
(1  0)

f + F
N(0;K0)

(1  )

f + fx + F
N(;K)
 f + fx
f

: (35)
As the two rms have the same sales level, S(;K) = S(0; K 0), by assumption, equation
(31) implies
N(;K) = N(0; K 0)

1  
1  0

f
f + fx

:
Inserting this expression into (35), and rewriting, we obtain
Q(;K)
Q(0; K 0)
=
f + F
N(0;K0) 
1 
1 0

f + F
N(0;K0)
> 1;
where the inequality follows as  > 0 by hypothesis.
Proof of Lemma 3. Inserting the expressions for (;K) and N(;K), the free entry
condition (26) can be rewritten as
f
Z 1
1
K

(   1)
Z 
0
g(;K)d +
Z x



1  

[(1  ) ] 1 g(;K)d (36)
+
Z 1
x

 (1 + fx=f)
1  

1 + 
1 + fx=f

(1  ) 
 1

g(;K)d
)
dK   F e
= 0:
Totally di¤erentiating this expression yields
d

f
Z 1
1
K
Z 
0
g(K; )d +
Z x


1
1  

[(1  ) ] 1 g(;K)d
+
Z 1
x

1 + fx=f
1  

1 + 
1 + fx=f

(1  ) 
 1

g(;K)d
)
dK
+
d
(1 + )
f
Z 1
1
K
Z 1
x

1 + fx=f
1  

1 + 
1 + fx=f

(1  ) 
 1

g(;K)ddK
= 0;
which establishes that dd < 0, and thus  0 < . Now suppose that (1 + ) were to
fall as well so that  0(1 + 0)  (1 + ). Then, the LHS of (36) would be negative after
the trade liberalization, a contradiction. Hence,  0(1 + 0) > (1 + ).
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Proof of Proposition 7. Consider rst a rm (;K) with  2 (0; 0]. By Proposition
6 and the denition of the threshold , we have N(;K)0 = N(;K) = K if  2 (0; 0]
and N(;K)0 < N(;K) = K if  2 (0; ]. Consider now a rm (;K) with  2
(; x0)[ (x; 1). Di¤erentiating equation (24) in conjunction with Lemma 3 implies that
N(;K)0 < N(;K) if  2 (; x0), and N(;K)0 > N(;K) if  2 (x; 1). Finally,
consider a rm (;K) with  2 (x0; x). From (24), we obtain the ratio between the
number of products post-liberalization and pre-liberalization:
N(;K)0
N(;K)
=

 0

 1


1 + 0
1 + fx=f
 1

< 1;
where the inequality follows from Lemma 3 and the parameter restriction (21).
Proof of Proposition 8. Consider rst a rm (;K) with  2 (0; 0). From equation
(32) and the fact that  0 <  by Lemma 3, it follows immediately thatQ(;K)0 < Q(;K)
for such a rm.
Consider now a rm (;K) with  2 (0; ). From (32) and (24), the ratio between
Tobins Q post-liberalization and pre-liberalization equals
Q(;K)0
Q(;K)
=
f + F
K
(1  ) 

f + F
K[(1 )0]1=
 :
By denition of the thresholds  and 0, we have for any  2 (0; ) that (1  )  > 1 >
(1  )  0. Hence, Q(;K)0 < Q(;K).
Next, consider a rm (;K) with  2 (; x0) [ (x; 1). Proposition 7 combined with
(32) immediately implies that Q(;K)0 < Q(;K) if  2 (; x0) and Q(;K)0 > Q(;K)
if  2 (x; 1). Finally, consider a rm (;K) with  2 (x0; x). Note that, from (24)
and (30), that for those rms that are not maximally diversied we have the following
relationship between the number of products and per-period prot: (;K) = (1 )(1 
) 1 [f + x(;K)fx]N(;K). For such rms, Tobins Q can be written as
Q(;K) =

1   + (1  )F
(;K)
 1
:
Hence, the ratio between Tobins Q post-liberalization and pre-liberalization equals
Q(;K)0
Q(;K)
=
1   + (1 )F
(;K)
1   + (1 )F
(;K)0
:
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To sign the e¤ect of an increase in trade freeness on Tobins Q it thus su¢ ces to establish
whether a rms prots have risen or fallen. Given Lemma 1, it follows immediately that
lim
#x0 [(;K)
0   (;K)] < 0 and lim"x [(;K)0   (;K)] > 0. To complete the
proof, it su¢ ces to show that (;K)0=(;K) is monotonically increasing in . From
(30), and noting that any rm with  2 (x0; x) is switching from non-exporting to
exporting, we have
ln

(;K)0
(;K)

= ln

1 +
fx
f

+
1

ln

1 + 0
1 + fx=f

 0


= ln

1 +
fx
f
 
1  
x0

!
  1

ln


 0

;
where the second line follows from (23). As  > x
0
and  >  0, this expression is strictly
increasing in  and is equal to zero at
 = b  x0 + ln (= 0)
ln(1 + fx=f)
:
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